The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
- 5h 5m
- Hernán Flom
- Cambridge University Press
- 2022
This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with, or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries with weak institutions, police act as interlocutors between criminals and politicians. It shows that whether and how politicians control their police forces explains the prevalence of different informal regulatory arrangements to control drug markets. Using detailed case studies built on 180 interviews in four cities in Argentina and Brazil, the book reconstructs how these informal regulatory arrangements emerged and changed over time.
- Introduces a theoretical framework to explain state responses to illicit markets
- Develops a topic that appeals to scholars and policymakers
- Engages an interdisciplinary audience through theory, case studies and practical implications
About the Author
Hernán Flom is Visiting Assistant Professor at Trinity College.
In this Book
-
Abbreviations
-
Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
-
A Theory of Drug Market Regulation
-
Particularistic Confrontation—The Persistent War between Gangs and Police in Rio de Janeiro
-
Particularistic Negotiation—The Decentralization of Police Corruption and Increase in Violence in Rosario, Santa Fe
-
Coordinated Protection—The Consolidation of Centralized Corruption in Buenos Aires
-
Coordinated Coexistence—The Consolidation of a Police–Gang Truce in São Paulo
-
Regulation of Criminal Markets in Weak Institutional Contexts
-
Appendix 2
-
References
