The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications
- 13h 24m
- Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant (eds)
- Cambridge University Press
- 2002
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concepts has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: “incentive theory,” “incomplete-contract theory” and “transaction-costs theory.” These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, and organization design) and the macroeconomics of “market” (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of firms’ strategy and state intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.
About the Editors
Eric Brosseau is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X and member of the Institut Universitaire de France. He is the director of the department GIFT or FORUM (University of Paris X and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), and associate researcher at ATOM (University of Paris I). He coordinates a CNRS research consortium of Information Technologies and the Society, and organizes the European School on New Institutional Economics. He is a member of the Boards of the International Society for New International Economics and of the Schumpeter Society.
Jean-Michel Glachant is Head of the Department of Economics at the University of Paris XI. He is a member of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, the International Association for Energy Economics, and the Association Française de Science Economique, as well as head of the Electricity Reforms Group at the ADIS research center.
In this Book
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The Economics of Contracts and The Renewal of Economics
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The New Institutional Economics
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Contract and Economic Organization
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The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships
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Entrepreneurship, Transaction-Cost Economics, and The Design of Contracts
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The Contract as Economic Trade
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Contract Theory and Theories of Contract Regulation
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Economic Reasoning and The Framing of Contract Law—Sale of an Asset of Uncertain Value
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A Transactions-Costs Approach to the Analysis of Property Rights
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Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory
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Norms and The Theory of the Firm
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Allocating Decision Rights Under Liquidity Constraints
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Complexity and Contract
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Authority, as Flexibility, is at the Core of Labor Contracts
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Positive Agency Theory—Place and Contributions
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Econometrics of Contracts—An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting
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Experiments on Moral Hazard and Incentives—Reciprocity and Surplus-Sharing
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Residual Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts—Substitutes or Complements?
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The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers—An Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation with Suppliers
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Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications Networks—From Strategic Behaviors to Property Rights
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Licensing in the Chemical Industry
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Inter-company Agreements and EC Competition Law
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Incentive Contracts in Utility Regulation
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Contractual Choice and Performance—The Case of Water Supply in France
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Institutional or Structural—Lessons from International Electricity Sector Reforms
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Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition—A Transactions-Cost Perspective
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Bibliography
